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*The individual classification of each article in this Review is given at the end of the article. The cut-off date for research on all articles was 1 July 1958.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF LAOS IN THE THAILAND-INDOCHINA LANDMASS

In view of the current political situation in Laos, strategic factors inherent in the geography of the Indochina-Thailand landmass as a whole deserve attention. The Communist-oriented bloc, which for the first time was permitted to have candidates, won 14 of the 21 vacant National Assembly seats in the recent elections, May 1958. The total number of seats in the National Assembly now numbers 59. Unless the divided and lackadaisical attitudes of the other Laotian political parties can be rectified, this political victory may presage the winning of the general elections in 1960 and eventual Communist control of Laos. Control of strategically located Laos would greatly improve the Communist position for further penetration of the Indochina-Thailand landmass (see Map 26172).

In the area extending from the valley of the Menam Chao Phraya in central Thailand eastward to the coast of Vietnam, the pattern of population distribution -- influenced by terrain and cultural factors -- is such as to facilitate subversion. Three major lowlands extend southward from the vicinity of the China border: the valleys of the Menam Chao Phraya and the Mekong River and the coastal plain of Vietnam. In the north, both river valleys are ravine-like, but they widen greatly in their deltaic reaches to the south. Since padi (wet rice) is the dominant food crop of Southeast Asia, the people

have traditionally migrated along river valleys and settled in the valley lowlands where rice culture is easiest. This has resulted in a population pattern in which densely settled lowlands are adjacent to very sparsely settled highland areas. In the Thailand-Indochina landmass the two river valleys and the Vietnamese coastal lowland are relatively advanced and prosperous.

Separating the three lowlands are two upland regions. On the west, the Khorat Plateau of northeastern Thailand extends from the Menam Chao Phraya to the Mekong River. East of the Mekong is a second upland region of plateaus and mountains that parallels the north-south coastal plain of Vietnam. In contrast to the lowlands the two uplands are backward (Figure 1) relatively sparsely populated, and economically retarded. At present, they are more susceptible to subversion than the lowlands.

Because of its position in the center of the Thailand-Indochina landmass, Laos, if dominated by the Communists, could serve as a springboard against the neighboring countries of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. Present Communist activities could then continue at an accelerated pace in the two upland areas bordering the valley -- the plateaus and mountains east of the Mekong River and the Khorat Plateau to the west.

Since the northern part of the boundary between South Vietnam and Laos lies within the upland east of the Mekong, subversion of the Vietnamese portion of this upland would not be difficult. Much



Figure 1. After a hunt on the Bolovens Plateau. The quartered deer is being transferred from the back of an elephant to the hunter's home. The scene is representative of the primitive life in the uplands.

of this region is rugged and densely forested. Its inhabitants, isolated by terrain and dense vegetation, are primitive, superstitious, tribal people who are extremely limited in outlook and have a traditional antipathy towards the lowland Vietnamese. The lowland Vietnamese, in turn, have despised the mountain tribes, applying the derogatory generic term of "Moi" (Savage) to the most primitive

among them. The upland, itself -- a veritable ethnographic musuem -- has been weakened by the lack of unity among the diverse tribal peoples (Figure 2).

Figure 2. A tribesman of the uplands wearing the distinctive dress of his particular tribe. Dress is one of the many facets of the diversity characteristic of the people of the uplands.

Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam, appears to be fully cognizant of the danger of Communist subversion in this area. He has displayed a sense of great urgency in his effort to make it less susceptible to subversion -- establishing in this upland region

a line of settlements made up of refugees from Communist North Vietnam and ex-soldiers whom he feels he can trust. Diem claims that Pathet Lao -- Viet Minh elements have already been installed on the Bolovens Plateau in the south of Laos. Similarly, his reiteration of the need for a good road from the Vietnamese coastal town of Qui Nhon to Pakse, Laos, on the Mekong River is inspired primarily by security needs. Such a road, extending across the upland region, would traverse the Kontum Plateau of South Vietnam and the Bolovens Plateau of Laos.

Farther south, the upland east of the Mekong extends into the northeast corner of Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, through his policy of neutrality,* has condoned the presence of Bloc technicians and encouraged the visits of Communist leaders. In ethnic composition the population of Cambodia is such that Communist subversion of some of its components would be relatively easy. The northeastern part of the country is inhabited by some 20,000 mountain tribesmen whom the Cambodians (Khmers) call "Phnongs" or mountain people. The Khmers despise the Phnongs and have neglected their needs. Khmer contact with them seems to be limited largely to exigencies when forced labor is needed for road gangs. Since many

*Sihanouk's neutrality has followed a tacking course in order to avoid too close association with either the Western or Communist blocs. His tacking to the left in 1956 laid the basis for all Sino-Soviet bloc activities in Cambodia during 1957. Now, concerned that he has given the Communists too much leeway in Cambodia, Sihanouk is once again reversing himself and taking measures against Communists within the country.

of these tribesmen are quasi-nomadic in their habits (reportedly, they cross into South Vietnam or southern Laos on occasion), Cambodian control over them is difficult. Reports of Viet Minh subversive efforts among the Phnongs are continuous.

The largest ethnic minority in Cambodia is the Vietnamese, numbering some 275,000 people out of Cambodia's total population of about 5 million. The Vietnamese are disliked as representatives of a generally hated and suspect race. This attitude creates an opening that could be exploited by the Viet Minh. Some of the Vietnamese, however, as Catholics are opposed to Communism. If disabused of the idea that Ho Chi Minh (the leader of the guerrilla war against French possession of Vietnam and currently head of Communist North Vietnam Government) is only a nationalist, they might rally to the support of Diem's pro-Western convictions. From the Communist point of view, the subversion of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia would be facilitated if the Mekong Valley in Laos were to fall under Communist control. The Mekong River offers a natural channel of access to large Vietnamese settlements around the Petit Lac of the Tonle Sap, where the Vietnamese have a virtual monopoly on the fishing industry, and in the delta provinces of Prey Veng and Svay Rieng, where there are strings of villages of Vietnamese rice farmers.

The Chinese comprise the second largest minority in Cambodia. Control of neighboring Laos by the Communists would be a powerful psychological factor further influencing the vast majority of the

250,000 Cambodian Chinese in favor of the Peiping regime. In the five Chinese Congregations* that largely controlled Cambodia's Chinese population until recently, two of the Congregation leaders were reportedly pro-Peiping, and 3 of the 5 Congregation board directors were Communist-controlled.

Contiguous to much of Laos on the west is the upland of Northeast Thailand -- the Khorat Plateau. It is a great saucer-shaped area, isolated from the rest of the country by encircling mountains, and tilted away from central Thailand toward the Mekong River. Much of the plateau is forest covered. Its climate is characterized by unrealiable and often scanty rainfall; and its soils are infertile and too permeable to hold enough moisture for successful agriculture. Many of its people are poverty stricken and illiterate, and their loyalty towards Bangkok is somewhat dubious. The Thai population on the plateau and the Laotian people across the Mekong River are both of Tai racial stock, and traditionally have intimate social and business contacts. If Laos fell under Communist domination, continuation of this intercourse would quickly expose the Thai people of the Khorat Plateau to subversion. Furthermore, there are some 40,000 Vietnamese living on the plateau, most of whom are reportedly loyal to Ho Chi Minh. Those who are still neutral or who

*Until April 1958 the Chinese community in Cambodia was divided into five congregations on the basis of regional origin as well as dialect -- Swatow, Cantonese, Fukien, Hainan, and Hakka.

now indicate a loyalty toward the pro-Western government of South Vietnam would undoubtedly be under much greater pressure than they are now to jump on the Hanoi bandwagon.

The Mekong River Valley has been a traditional corridor for southward movement of peoples from China. Control of Laos would enable the Communists to improve existing transportation facilities for further expansion into Southeast Asia. An improved road already extends from Lao Kay on the Chinese-North Vietnam border to Dien Bien Phu. From here to Luang Prabang, the royal capital of Laos, a relatively good water transportation route is provided by the Nam Hou, a tributary of the Mekong.* From Luang Prabang a road -- which in places deteriorates into a track -- extends southward and then generally parallels the Mekong to Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The Luang Prabang-Vientiane section of the road is being improved through American aid, and the French are improving the poorer road stretches from Vientiane down river. From Phnom Penh a road that will lead to the new French-constructed Cambodian port of Kompong Som is being constructed under American supervision. Another road leads southeastward from Phnom Penh to Saigon, the capital and principal port of South

*In his defense of the French defeat, General Henri Navarre said that the Dien Bien Phu fortress was established to defend Luang Prabang because "the valley of the Nam Hou (Nam Ou) was a good water route which allowed the Viets to bring all the desired equipment to Luang Prabang."

Vietnam. Thus, if the Communists gained control of Laos, they would have possession of a strategic part of the route that leads southward to Kompong Som and Saigon. Furthermore, it would put them close to the Thailand rail terminals at Warin and near Nong Khai, on the Khorat Plateau.

In the past, responsible American observers in Southeast Asia have stated that no area in the world is more vulnerable to Communist subversion than Laos. This appraisal takes on added and ominous significance when the position of Laos is considered along with the geographic factors that make the country uniquely suitable as a base from which neighboring countries might be penetrated. (Secret)

NEW SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The present pattern of population distribution in South Vietnam has been significantly affected by the refugee and resettlement programs of the South Vietnamese Government. The refugee program involved the 800,000 people who, starting in 1954, fled to South Vietnam to escape Communist domination in North Vietnam. The resettlement program is concerned with the permanent resettlement of some 100,000 indigenous South Vietnamese, including many discharged soldiers and their families, on new lands or on agricultural lands that were abandoned during the Viet Minh revolt. Both refugee and resettlement groups form population elements that are probably strongly anti-Communist.

The program of establishing villages for the refugees from North Vietnam was officially completed on 30 June 1957 (Figure 1). Most of the refugee villages are located in the Quang Tri--Tourane and the Saigon--Bhan Thiet areas. In some instances, several new villages are grouped around an administrative center. The location of the villages or the village centers is shown on a set of maps at 1:250,000* recently received from Saigon, and also on the accompanying Map 26928.

*CIA Map Library Call No. 109268. Keyed to this set of 21 maps, and filed with them as a map supplement, is a list, Refugee and Resettlement Villages, which shows the names of village centers and all villages (including those grouped around the centers), the number of families, and the number of individuals at each site.

Figure 1. A refugee village under construction. All work must be completed during the dry winter season since rice cultivation requires the full time of the peasants during the wet summer.

The resettlement or land-development program was initiated more recently and is currently in progress. Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam, is extremely interested in the success of this program since he visualizes it as an important way of preventing Communist infiltration of the countryside. Although areas involved in the program are spread throughout the country, Diem is particularly concerned (almost to the point of obsession) about the Pays Montagnard du Sud (P.M.S.). He is convinced that resettlement villages here would provide a "Human Wall" against Communist penetration of the region.

The P.M.S. is a highland region that extends from about the latitude of Djiring, 11°30'N, to about 16°N, and inland from the Vietnamese coastal lowland to the Laotian border. It is essentially a region of plateaus separated by mountain ranges and valleys. The plateaus are generally covered by pine forests or, in the case of the Darlac Plateau, by brush and grassland, whereas the intervening mountain ranges and valleys support a dense rainforest. The rough terrain and dense vegetation of the valleys and mountains surrounding the plateaus have discouraged the development of a good road net that would have provided a link with the rest of the country, and the isolated region has remained very sparsely populated, primitive, and economically retarded. An influx of the advanced Vietnamese people from the coastal lowlands, who would undoubtedly have improved the economy of the P.M.S., was prevented during French control of the country by a decree that banned the South Vietnamese from the P.M.S. on cultural grounds. However, if the Vietnamese had been permitted to enter the region, they would have hesitated to establish homes there. As wet-rice cultivators, the Vietnamese consider the coastal lowland an ideal location for their type of agriculture. To them the highlands present not only an unfavorable agricultural environment, but also an unhealthful one since malaria is endemic to the region.

The generally low opinion that the Vietnamese have of the P.M.S. as a region in which to live is reinforced by their contempt for the

indigenous inhabitants, who are known as Moi* or, preferably, Montagnards. In 1956 the Montagnards numbered about 377,000 out of the estimated population of 530,000 in the region. At the same time the Vietnamese population was about 150,000 -- having been increased from only 6,000 in 1953 by the refugees from the north who settled in the less primitive sections of the P.M.S.

The Montagnards are not a homogeneous group; the various tribes of the highlands differ physically, culturally, and linguistically; and each tribe maintains its customary way of life. The great cultural diversity of the region results in a notable lack of consensus among the people. There has been no centralized social or political organization among them. Probably the most significant common denominators among the tribes are (1) their ethnocentrism, (2) a suspicion of Vietnamese motives, and (3) a general feeling, at least until recently, that the national government at Saigon cared little about the people of the P.M.S.

These characteristics of the P.M.S. and its inhabitants make Diem aware that the region is vulnerable to continued Communist infiltration and subversion. He feels that within 2 or 3 years the area must be settled and integrated economically and politically

*To replace the derogatory term, "Moi," the French coined the word "Pemsian." It was derived from the initials P.M.S.I. that represent the general appellation "Peuples Montagnard de Sud Indochinois" or Mountain People of South Indochina. More recently the South Vietnamese Government in its attempt to equate the Montagnards with the Vietnamese have referred to them as "les Compatriots de la Haute Region."

with the rest of South Vietnam. Diem contends that, after a few years, pressures from the Vietnamese peoples as well as from various foreign powers for the reunification of South and North Vietnam will force him to acquiesce to some compromises with North Vietnam. Such compromises almost certainly will result in an influx of Communist agents into South Vietnam, particularly into the P.M.S.

As of April 1958, some 21,000 participants in the resettlement program had been settled in the P.M.S., currently the chief region benefitting from the program, and it is expected that the number will reach 30,000 by the end of the year. However, the enduring success of the project is contingent upon many factors. The South Vietnamese Government must overcome its almost complete ignorance of the region and the tribes living there. It must not allow the new settlers to infringe on traditional tribal lands nor to treat the Montagnards as inferiors. It must build better roads, provide more adequate living facilities for the settlers, and supply amenities such as schools in order to counteract Viet Minh propaganda among the Montagnards. To the credit of the Vietnamese Government, steps have been and are being taken to achieve these objectives. The rapidity and thoroughness with which they can be achieved will determine the success or failure of the resettlement projects and ultimately will affect the prestige of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime. (Confidential)

THE CONTINENTAL-SHELF CONVENTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE*

The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, an 86-nation meeting of 9 weeks duration, terminated its work in Geneva 29 April 1958. The conference was convened to bring order out of some of the chaotic conditions which exist with respect to the law of the sea. Although the conference failed to reach an agreement on the critical question of the breadth of the territorial sea, significant progress was made on most other problems. The achievements of the conference are embodied mainly in four conventions: (1) the territorial sea (excluding its breadth), (2) high-seas problems, (3) high-seas fisheries, and (4) the continental shelf. The overall work of the conference and the political currents that affected it were the subject of numerous United Nations and U.S. Department of State reports that were prepared while the conference was in session; and the work of the conference will presumably be studied more penetratingly as time permits analysis of pertinent documentary material.

The scope of the present article is limited to one phase of the work of the conference, namely, the Convention on the Continental Shelf. This convention,** like others that were adopted, is not in force at

*The article has been coordinated with the Special Advisor on Geography, Department of State.

**The Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted in plenary session on 26 April 1958. The vote was: for - 57; against - 3 (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan); abstain - 8.

this writing and will not become effective until 30 days after it has been ratified by 22 countries. The following discussion is therefore an examination of matters pending, with some emphasis on the geographic factors involved, rather than a definitive weighing of tested laws.

Important among the factors that made problems of the continental shelf a major subject for the consideration of the Law of the Sea Conference were (1) the fast-improving technology for exploiting seabed resources, especially petroleum; (2) the adaptation of this technology for defense purposes (man-made islands to support radar and other equipment); and (3) the growing apprehension in certain countries that the construction of fixed installations on continental shelves might seriously affect freedom of navigation and limit access by non-coastal countries to their traditional fishing grounds.

Concept of Continental Shelf Sovereignty

A 1945 Proclamation of United States policy with respect to the natural resources of the seabed adjoining the coasts of the United States focused world attention on problems pertaining to the legal status of the continental shelf. This proclamation, a reflection of the growing importance of offshore petroleum exploitation, reads as follows:

> Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf extends to the

> shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected.

Following issuance of the proclamation, several countries asserted claims to their continental shelves. Some of the claims were specifically restricted to the natural resources of the seabed; others were not. The Convention on the Continental Shelf adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference seeks to standardize claims by making the same distinction set forth in the above proclamation, namely, that the coastal state has rights to the fixed natural resources of the seabed, but these rights do not alter the status of superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters.

The natural resources referred to in the convention are

> ...the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.

Thus, the coastal state would have sovereign rights to exploit minerals (including petroleum) and such organisms as oysters, clams, and sponges; but it would not have similar rights in relation to free-swimming species. It is interesting that the conference, by one vote, placed Crustacea (lobsters, shrimps, crabs, etc.) in the free-swimming category.

The convention notes that in taking reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its

natural resources, a coastal state must not cause unjustifiable interference with navigation nor impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipelines. The right of coastal countries to exploit the resources of the continental shelf by means of tunneling is specifically stated. The convention further indicates that the rights of a country to explore and exploit the continental shelf adjoining its coast are not dependent on occupation or any express proclamation and that, if the coastal country does not exercise its privileges, no one may do so without its consent.

Seabed Exploitation Limits

For purposes of the convention, the term "continental shelf" is defined as referring

> (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.

Significantly, this definition includes the floors of shallow gulfs and seas that are not "continental shelf" in a strict sense, for example, the Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, although the normal limit of seabed exploitation rights is set at 200 meters -- a depth corresponding to that at which the continental shelf generally ends -- the right to exploit beyond that depth, where technically possible, is acknowledged. Some critics of the convention view this as a weakness, and feel that a precise seaward depth limit for the continental shelf should have been established.

The deepest water in which the oil industry has to date operated stationary platform rigs is 137 feet (ca. 42 meters), and this depth is believed to approach the maximum economic limit for completion of wells above the water surface. Work is underway, however, on methods for drilling for oil from floating platforms, a technique that has been used effectively in exploratory drilling for sulphur in the Gulf of Mexico. Some oil operators believe that, by combining floating drilling structures with techniques for subsea completion of wellheads, oil exploitation may eventually be possible at depths conservatively estimated at 600 feet and more optomistically placed at "1,000 feet or more."

Status of Offshore Installations

The convention on the continental shelf indicates that the "coastal State is entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and exploitation of its natural resources." Neither in the quoted clause acknowledging this right nor in other references to it, however, are military installations specifically approved or disapproved. At the conference the Soviet Union pressed for prohibition of military installations on the continental shelf, a move aimed at the radar warning "islands" of the United States, but failed to gain the necessary support.

Countries maintaining installations on the continental shelf are required by the convention to establish 500-meter safety zones around such installations and are "obliged to undertake, in the safety zones,

all appropriate measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents." The convention specifically notes that offshore installations under the jurisdiction of a coastal state "do not possess the status of islands." It is further indicated that offshore installations have no territorial sea of their own, and that their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal state.

Boundaries Dividing the Continental Shelf Between Countries

Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose coasts are opposite each other (for example, Italy is opposite Yugoslavia on the Adriatic Sea), the convention provides that the boundaries of shelf areas appertaining to such states shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement and unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured. These same principles are also to be used in dividing the continental shelf between "adjacent" countries. For example, where Brazil adjoins Uruguay along the shore of the South Atlantic, the boundary dividing the continental shelf between them will be equidistant from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each country is measured. In the delimitation of the boundaries of the continental shelf, the convention indicates that any lines

drawn in accordance with the above noted principles should be "defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land."

The principles outlined in the convention for dividing the continental shelf between states seem basically equitable, and in many areas the working out of settlements in accord with them should not be difficult. In some places, however, serious problems may be encountered. For example, in the Persian Gulf the coastal termini of some international (including protectorate) boundaries are not firmly fixed, and portions of the coast present complex patterns of peninsulas, islands, reefs, and sandbars wherein determination of boundaries may be difficult. Similar difficulties may be encountered in determining boundaries in the islet-strewn seas that separate Indonesia from neighboring countries.

Among the foreseeable settlement problems in various parts of the world are those likely to develop around the fixing of baselines (low-water lines) marking the landward limit of the territorial sea. Since boundaries dividing the continental shelf between countries are to be measured from these baselines, their positioning is paramount. The rules for locating baselines are explicitly stated in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (one of the four conventions adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference), but considerable interpretive latitude still remains -- and presumably

must be left -- to coastal countries. In some cases the temptation to abuse this latitude may be great, for example, where pushing the baseline seaward would mean a larger share of an offshore oilfield.

Oceanographic Research

The right of institutions of one country to conduct oceanographic research on the continental shelf of another is set forth in the convention, subject to certain provisions: (1) permission must be obtained from the country exercising sovereignty over the continental shelf, (2) the sovereign country shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate in the research, and (3) the findings shall be published. The convention indicates, however, that the coastal state shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research.

Despite a clear call for a liberal approach, it remains to be seen whether all countries will be open handed in allowing institutions of other countries to conduct oceanographic research on their continental shelves. The fact that it is difficult to draw a sharp line between "purely scientific" oceanographic data and those required to support mining, submarine operations, and antisubmarine measures may make some countries very reluctant to permit foreign research. Should this attitude develop, it would be unfortunate, since the need for oceanographic research is great, as evinced by the fact that measures for the conservation of many important food fish cannot now be undertaken for want of basic facts.

Appraisal and Prospects

In areas where physical and political geography present great complexity, application of the principles of the continental shelf convention may be difficult and may temporarily invite international discord. On a world basis, however, the influence of the convention over a considerable period of time should be conciliatory and stabilizing.

Among the factors that will have much to do with whether the convention succeeds or fails are the provisions for settling disputes. These are incorporated in a separate protocol (Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes) adopted by the Law of the Sea Conference. This instrument provides that disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the four conventions adopted by the conference, including the Convention on the Continental Shelf, shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The number of countries that will sign this protocol and use the machinery it provides is now unknown. If considerable, however, it could contribute greatly to the prompt and peaceful settlement of disputes and thus to the development and general strengthening of the continental shelf convention.

Although evaluation can now be little more than an inventory of incertitudes, the continental shelf convention seems to set the stage for more complete and effective use of offshore resources. Whether

ratification will step up the tempo of oil and mineral exploration in offshore areas is a moot question, but deserves to be considered as a possibility. In any event, coastal countries may find it advantageous to discourage exploratory activity in areas of multinational interest until boundaries dividing the continental shelf between countries have been fixed, operating on the theory that the establishment of such boundaries will generally be far easier before oil or minerals are discovered than afterward.

The convention represents a reasonably good first step toward establishing a body of modern international law pertaining to the continental shelf; but, since it is the product of compromise, the document quite naturally does not cover all the ground in all ways that all contributors thought best. In the past, effectiveness of international law has depended more upon wide acceptance of basic concepts than upon the excellence or shortcommings of fine points. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask, "Will there be general acceptance of the letter and spirit of the convention and a willingness to seek solutions within its framework?" Time alone can give a firm answer. At this juncture, however, the strong interest of many countries in establishing clear title to seabed resources near their coasts augurs well for "yes." (Confidential)

Principal Sources

(Note: Numerous Department of State telegrams and resumés reporting on the Law of the Sea Conference while it was in session were consulted but are not listed. Also excluded from the list are various standard geographic texts.)

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RECENT PLACE-NAME CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION

No other government attaches so much significance to place names as does the Soviet Union -- significance in the political propaganda sense, not in a traditional or practical sense. Places in the Soviet Union are named and renamed in response to the changing political climate with respect to individuals and ethnic groups, and even changes involving the smallest settlements require action on the part of the presidium of the republic supreme soviet. Nearly 40 percent of the Soviet cities with a population of more than 100,000 have experienced name changes during the Soviet regime.

Two recent series of changes, which together affected hundreds of populated places and administrative units, illustrate the general policy on place-name changes. The first, initiated early in 1957, was linked with the restoration of administrative status of five ethnic groups that were exiled during World War II for collaboration with the Germans. All of the places affected by this restoration of administrative units were in a particular area of the northern Caucasus (see Map 27001). The other series of changes, initiated in September 1957, involved places throughout the Soviet Union and was the result of an official decree that prohibits naming a place after a public figure during his lifetime.

In 1944 the peoples of five ethnic groups (Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, and Karachai) were deported from their homelands in

the northern Caucasus. The administrative units that bore the names of these peoples were at the same time abolished and absorbed by other nationality units, or reorganized into administrative units without national character. Thus Groznyy Oblast' was created from the former territory of the Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR; the Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR became the Kabardinskaya ASSR; the Karachayevskaya AO was absorbed by surrounding administrative divisions; and the Kalmytskaya ASSR was absorbed largely by Astrakhanskaya Oblast' and Stavropolskiy Kray. To add finality to the abolishment of these nationality units, many place names, some of which testified to the ethnic character of the inhabitants, were also changed.

Now that the nationality units have been restored and the people have been allowed to return to their homelands, many places have officially regained their pre-1944 names. Of the places that were renamed at the time of the restoration, Elista -- the administrative center of Kalmytskaya AO -- is the largest (see tabulation on following page).

The second series of place-name changes was initiated on 11 September 1957 when the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree that regulated the naming of administrative units, urban areas, and other populated places as well as industrial enterprises, collective farms, institutions, and organizations. The decree stated that the naming of a place after a public figure during his lifetime was characteristic of the cult of the individual and

definitely was not in the spirit of Leninist traditions. The decree stated further that, henceforth, no places should be named after living individuals, and that those places currently so named should be renamed.

Name Changes in Nationality Units

Current Name	Former Name	Location
	Kalmytskaya AO	
Elista	Stepnoy	46°16'N 44°14'E
Tselinnyy	Stepnoy	46°39'N 44°31'E
Komsomol'skiy	Krasnyy Kamushanik	45°21'N 46°02'E
Yusta	Trudovoy	47°05'N 46°15'E
Yashalta	Stepnoye	46°21'N 42°16'E
Yashkul'	Peschanyy	46°15'N 45°25'E
	Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR	
Achkhoy-Martan	Novosel'skoye	43°11'N 45°18'E
Kurchaloy	Chkalovo	43°13'N 46°05'E
Nazran	Kosta-Khetagurovskiy	43°13'N 44°29'E
Nozhay-Yurt	Andalaly	43°06'N 46°24'E
Sayasan	Ritlyab	43°04'N 46°18'E
Shali	Mezhdurech'ye	43°09'N 45°54'E
Urus-Martan	Krasnoarmeyskoye	43°08'N 45°32'E
	Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya AO	
Karachayevsk	Klukhori	43°46'N 41°54'E

The largest city affected by the second series of changes is Perm' (population 538,000), which bore the name of Molotov from 1940 to 1957, but had been known as Perm' prior to 1940. Since the city is an administrative center, the name of the oblast also reverted to Permskaya Oblast'. Two smaller "Molotov" cities were also affected -- the Molotovsk (68,000) of Arkhangel'skaya Oblast' was renamed Severodvinsk, and the Molotovsk (19,000) of Kirovskaya Oblast' is now Nolinsk.

In the Ukraine, the former city of Voroshilovgrad (251,000) has been renamed Lugansk -- the name by which it was known prior to 1935. The administrative unit of which it is the center is now known as Luganskaya Oblast'. In Primorskiy Kray, the city of Voroshilov (101,000) has been renamed Ussuriysk.

In December 1957, the city of Chkalov (226,000), named in 1938 after a famous pilot who died that year, was given its former name of Orenburg, and Chkalovskaya Oblast' also reverted to the name of Orenburgskaya Oblast'. Although this change in the name of a major Soviet city was not specifically dictated by the terms of the decree on place names, the timing links it to this series of changes.

The new administrative handbook of the Soviet Union* lists about a hundred changes of names derived from Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Budenny. A complete listing of name changes of administrative units down to rayon level -- cities, villages, and other populated places -- is given on pages 591 through 623 of the handbook. In many cases the recent changes restore former names. (Unclassified)

*Informatsionno-Statisticheskiy Otdel. Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. SSSR, Administrativno-Territorial'noye Deleniya Soyuzhnikh Respublik, Moskva, 1958. Contains complete information on administrative changes as of 1 January 1958, and some major changes to March 1958.

THE OFFICER'S LIBRARY ATLAS MIRA

The Officer's Library Atlas Mira* is an invaluable addition to the library of every student of Soviet geography and a useful tool for the geographer interested in any part of the world. It contains both general and economic maps covering the entire world and also includes special features such as textual descriptions supplementing many of the maps -- a combination rarely bound together in one volume. Many roads and railroads never before shown on available Soviet maps 25X1B

25X1B are included on the general maps of the USSR. [redacted]

The small page size of the atlas, which permits a double-page map size of only 7-3/8" x 10", necessarily limits the scales at which maps can be drawn; and few of the maps other than those of the urban

*CIA Map Library Call No. aA000 .U52 1958. This new Atlas Mira, published by the General Staff of the Soviet Army as part of the Officer's Library series, should not be confused with an atlas of the same name published by the GUGK (Glavnoye Upravleniye Geodezii i Kartografii) in 1954 (CIA Map Library Call No. aA000 .U584 1954). The earlier atlas, a scholarly reference work of the highest quality, is especially noteworthy for its highly accurate representations of terrain and its more than 205,000 place names, whereas the Officer's Library atlas generalizes terrain and contains only about 27,000 place names. Throughout this report the new atlas of the Officer's Library series is referred to as "The Officer's Atlas Mira."

area are, in fact, at scales larger than 1:4,000,000. However, the high quality of the cartographic workmanship and the effective choice of symbols make the maps easy to read despite the small scales and the large amount of information on them.

The 459-page atlas is divided into six major sections. The most outstanding of these is the fifth, which includes medium-scale (1:250,000) maps of 16 Soviet urban areas -- the 15 republic capitals and Leningrad. Except for the urban maps of Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, and Leningrad published in 1956 in Volume 41 of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia -- and a few tourist sketches -- no other post-1939 Soviet maps that show the geographical situation of a city, its extent, and general layout are available. The fifth section also includes medium-scale maps of 59 urban areas outside the Soviet Union.

25X1B [redacted]

25X1B [redacted] Of particular interest is a map showing the 105 economic-administrative regions that were established in July 1957. Since the map was printed, however, two of these regions -- Kamenskiy and Balashovskiy -- have been abolished,and a third -- Samarkandskiy -- has been split in two. Other subjects included on maps covering the entire USSR pertain to political-administrative structure, population, transportation, industry, agriculture, and relief. The regional maps cover the European USSR at scales of 1:7,500,000 or larger, and most of southern Siberia and the Far East at 1:10,000,000 or larger. Two maps of the

areas surrounding Moscow and Leningrad at 1:600,000 and one each of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea are included. The maps are detailed enough to show boundaries, settlements, transportation arteries, major mineral deposits, and forest cover. Some spot heights are given. Of particular interest are the maps showing the recently completed rail lines between Murmansk and Pechenga, Stalinsk and Abakan, and Okha and Nogliki on Sakhalin.

Accompanying each map that covers one or more union republics is a page of text giving the statistics on the cities, industry, agriculture, and transportation network of each republic.

The sixth section consists of 25 tables of information of the type found in the World Almanac. They include various statistics and facts about the physical, political, and economic geography of the world, with special emphasis upon the Soviet Union, and also comparative tables of weights and measures and money. One can find, for example, the area, average and maximum depth, salinity, tidal range, and temperature of the Black Sea.

25X1C

[redacted]

The fourth section, Maps of Foreign Countries, covers in some detail the entire world outside the Soviet Union with the single exception of Antarctica. Each country or group of countries is depicted on both a general map and on a combined economic-agricultural map -- except the United States, for which there are separate economic

and agricultural maps. Until the publication of the Officer's Atlas Mira, such detailed coverage of the world was not generally available in one volume.

Two features of the economic maps that are of particular interest are the inclusion of major gas and oil pipelines and of areas in which lumbering is an economic activity. Although lumbering areas are depicted on the economic maps by a green tone similar to that used to show the extent of forest land on the general maps, the two categories are not likely to be confused since they do not appear on the same map.

Western Europe, covered by 35 of the 107 maps in the section, is treated the most intensively of all the major regions of the world. Next in order of detailed treatment are the Far East (including India and Pakistan), to which 23 maps are devoted, and the Americas, with 20. Fewer maps cover Africa (11), the Communist Bloc countries and Yugoslavia (10), the Middle East (5), and the Australia-New Zealand-New Guinea area (3).

Larger scale maps and insets portray such industrially important areas as Silesia, Rhineland-Westphalia, Alsace-Lorraine, the British Midlands, and the London area, as well as the strategically important areas of the Iron Gate of the Danube, Cyprus, Palestine, Kashmir, Java, North Vietnam, northern Tunisia, the lower Nile, and, in the United States, the Great Lakes region and the Middle Atlantic states. The Panama Canal is shown at 1:750,000, the largest scale used in the fourth section.

Each set of maps of a country or group of countries is accompanied by a textual description that gives, for each country, information about its size and boundaries, administrative structure, population, major cities, political parties, armed forces, industry, agriculture, transportation network, and exports and imports. These descriptions are somewhat colored by the official party line -- for example, naming the Communist Party as one of the major political parties in the United States -- but the nonpolitical facts are accurate and are presented in a convenient form.

The second section contains 57 maps (counting insets) of the world, of continents and parts of continents, and of oceans. The maps range in scale from 1:230,000,000 for an airline map of the world to 1:100,000 for an inset of Gibraltar. The subjects covered include relief and climate, population, transportation, mineral resources and industry. Particular emphasis is placed upon Europe, all or parts of which appear on 19 separate maps. Six of them portray Western Europe alone, and 6 others show the straits upon which the Soviet Union is primarily dependent for access to the Atlantic -- the Danish straits, the Turkish straits, and the Strait of Gibraltar.

The first section is primarily a guide to map reading and to the use of maps in general. It includes not only an explanation of map symbols used in the atlas, but also, in parallel columns, photographs of various types of terrain and small topographic maps of corresponding areas. It also gives illustrations of military uses for maps of

various types and scales. A table of sunrise and sunset for the northern hemisphere as far north as 80°N and a map of world time zones are also included in the first section.

Finally, the atlas contains an index of about 27,000 place names keyed to the maps by a grid system. (Confidential)

THE NATIONAL ATLAS OF INDIA

The National Atlas of India, preliminary edition in Hindi*, which has recently been received in Washington, is to India what the Soviet Atlases are to the USSR, and the French National Atlas is to France.

Indian Government officials who are responsible for India's economic planning had been aware of the need for a comprehensive cartographical and statistical publication incorporating the basic geographic data on the country. In response to this need the National Atlas Organization was established in June 1954 under the aegis of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research. Two years later it was announced that a preliminary Hindi edition of the atlas would be published under the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1961). Cartographic work on the Hindi edition commenced in December 1956, and the edition was published in late 1957. The maps were printed by the Survey of India, and the atlas was published by the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research -- to which the Survey of India was transferred in April 1957. A more comprehensive English-language edition of the atlas was originally scheduled for publication at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, 1961. However, it now appears that this edition will be delayed considerably, but the map sheets comprising it will be published separately as completed.

*CIA Map Library Call No. aH306.155.

The atlas is a valuable addition to Washington map holdings on India, and will be of particular interest to those officials who have an interest in the economic development of the country through the Indian Five-Year Plans. In addition to a wealth of basic economic information, the atlas includes several maps -- such as the one indicating proposed expenditure of funds for soil conservation under the Second Five-Year Plan -- that have specific reference to the Five-Year Plans.

The Hindi edition of the atlas contains 26 numbered plates comprising 21 maps of India at a scale of 1:5 million, 16 at a scale of 1:10 million, and 38 inset maps at smaller scales. It also contains 20 insets of smaller areas at larger scales, and 3 maps covering the World and the Western and Eastern Hemispheres.

The maps of the atlas cover a wide range of subjects. Foremost in position in the atlas are the world map, the maps of the hemispheres, and the administrative map of India. Two unnumbered plates contain four regional maps that show the lithology of India. Most of the maps fall into three general categories: physical, economic, and sociological. Within the first of these categories the maps relate to terrain, drainage, rainfall and temperature, and winds. The economic maps show the distribution of minerals, soils (also the intensity of soil erosion and the proposed expenditure by states for soil conservation during the Second Five-Year Plan), forests and arable land, food crops, cash crops, and livestock. Also

included among the economic maps are those that deal with electric power, industries (including village handicraft and other small industries), and transportation. The sociological group includes maps that show the distribution of rural, urban, and tribal populations; educational and scientific research institutions; health facilities and personnel engaged in medical work; and archaeological monuments and points of interest to tourists.

Most of the maps in the atlas are improvements over those that have been available before, and some of them cover subjects that are new to Washington collections. Particularly noteworthy are the maps that show the locations of industry, including uranium-thorium and rare-earth processing plants; airports (some 95) and their importance by ratio of passengers handled; educational and scientific institutions, including the 14 national laboratories of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research; and the headquarters of Indian representatives abroad (e.g. vice-consulates, embassies and special missions) together with the number of Indians residing in different foreign countries.

One of the chief assets of the National Atlas of India is the uniformity of scale of the maps, which facilitates the correlation of factors on one map with those on another. In the past, such correlation has been complicated by the differences in scale among available maps on India. Furthermore, all of the atlas maps of India are on the same projection -- Lambert's conical orthomorphic. Metric measurements are used throughout the atlas, in conformity

with the Indian Government's adoption of the metric system. The individual map sheets are about 25 by 28 inches and are folded to fit a 17- by 26-inch cover. They are bound in a loose-leaf binding similar to that used for the French National Atlas.

To facilitate exploitation of the Hindi edition by English-language users, the compilers have included in English (1) a list of the maps by number, title, and scale; (2) a detailed description of each map, together with supplementary information about the subjects covered; (3) an explanation of the Hindi legend used on each map; (4) an adequate although not very clear place name map; and (5) a list of 2,789 administrative units -- tahsils, taluks, and thanas (police stations) -- that are subdivisions of the districts into which the 14 states of India are divided. The subdivisions on the administrative map are keyed to the list by number. Even so, an English-language user would almost certainly have difficulty in using the Hindi edition, particularly the administrative map, because of the many complications of the Devanagri script and the even more complicated system of correlating key numbers with place names.

It is regrettable that an agreement was not concluded with the Nepalese Government to include Nepal within the scope of the Atlas, even though the inclusion of foreign territory is understandably incompatible with the concept of a national atlas. To an analyst who works with the area the absence of Nepal on the maps seems like an unnatural void. Sikkim and Bhutan, which are considered as

protectorates, are included on the maps, as are Jammu and Kashmir -- which India claims as part of its national territory. (Unclassified)



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

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